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Technology
Mercedes Bunz
Technologies make worlds appear. It is this capacity that has 
always interested the contemporary critic when turning to the 
concept of technology. In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt, 
for example, discusses the effect technologies have on “the very 
worldliness of the human artifice” (1958, 150). Samuel Weber 
(1996) makes the same point – that technologies are “Upsetting 
the Set­Up” – when thinking through Martin Heidegger, who 
before him had remarked: “Techné belongs to bringing­forth, to 
poiesis. It is something poietic” (Heidegger 1977, 12). By adding 
new objects, by varying the measurements, by changing the 
perspectives, by linking what had been disconnected and con­
necting what had been apart, by providing destructive powers, by 
confusing the boundaries, technologies allow new and different 
movements of thoughts, things, and bodies into the human 
artifice. 
Although all technologies have the forceful and fabulous capacity 
to create a different world, the worlds that appear do not 
automatically lead in any progressive direction. In other words, 
their technical realities are necessarily different, but not nec­
essarily “better.” Walter Benjamin’s circular glasses were among 
the first to come across this: in his famous essay “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility” (1936), he 
discusses the divergent ways in which the new means of (re)
192 production – photography and cinema – are affecting the masses, 
an affecting that can be twofold as the “increasing proletari­
anization of modern man and the increasing formation of masses 
are two aspects of the same process” (Benjamin 1936, 120; emphasis 
added). Technologies can be employed to manipulate the masses 
in the interest of fascist capital, or they can be employed to 
allow masses meet themselves thereby helping them to under­
stand their own formation, and therefore their needs. As 
Benjamin makes clear in his essay, the actual appropriation, the 
usage decides which of those worlds will be created. To ensure 
an appearance of a world aligned against fascism, his essay 
introduces a specific take on the new technologies:
In what follows, the concepts which are introduced … are 
completely useless for the purposes of fascism. On the other 
hand, they are useful for the formulation of revolutionary 
demands. (102)
Here, Benjamin points out that technologies change the world 
that is in place. New technical realities “neutralize a number 
of traditional concepts – such as creativity and genius, eternal 
value and mystery” (101). As they “neutralize” the framework of 
the world in place, technologies create an opening that harbors 
a political moment. It is technology that makes this opening 
possible – a point Benjamin makes again in another text, where 
he describes “technical revolutions” as “fracture points”: “[I]t is 
there that the different political tendencies may be said to come 
to the surface” (1927, 17). Years later, in “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 
Donna Haraway embraces technology for the same reason: 
“The frame for my sketch is set by the extent and importance of 
rearrangements in world­wide social relations tied to science and 
technology” (1991, 161).
If technology has the capacity to question the world in place and 
if it offers difference, as Benjamin and Haraway write, technology 
is in this world but not of this world: It is alien to its conditions. 
Benjamin writes: “In every new technical revolution, the political 
193tendency is transformed, as if by its own volition, from a con­
cealed element of art into a manifest one” (1927, 17; emphasis 
added). We certainly can work with technology and with the 
political tendencies it has created, but we can neither control 
nor predict technology and thus which tendencies it will create. 
Technology follows its own, alien logic. Even in the twenty­first 
century, in which prediction has become a paradigm, this is still 
the case: In a field as closely guarded as the digital economy, we 
are never certain what will be “the next big thing.” We cannot 
predict the future of the technology we have invented. Alien to 
us, technology has the capacity to set up a truly different frame, 
which makes a new world appear. 
Philosophical explorations of this frame tracing technology’s 
alien­ness have started. Against the assumption that algorithms 
are obstinate step­by­step procedures, Luciana Parisi (2013) dis­
cusses the blind spots of computers with Chaitin’s constant, for 
example, a number that is real but not computable. Parisi reads 
those alien logics of calculation as symptoms of algorithmic 
thought and uses them as a point of departure for an immanent 
critique of algorithmic practices and methods. Benjamin Bratton 
(2016), on the other hand, describes today’s planetary­scale 
computation as an alien political geography. Based on mineral 
sourcing, it links the earth, the user, and technology in new ways 
and is inhabited by meaningful users, “human and otherwise”: 
It is with vestigial stupidity that we police the human/animal 
divide in the way that we do, and it is equally misguided to 
insist that computing machines are ‘just tools’ and not also 
co­Users along with us. (Bratton 2016, 349)
The theoretical challenge, of course, is then not to think of 
them as “just subjects” either – a challenge we are not very 
well equipped for. As Bratton points out, “we lack adequate 
vocabularies to properly engage the operations of planetary­
scale computation” (xviii).
194 In our philosophical thinking of technology, the problem of 
vocabulary, however, has been central for quite a while – no 
lesser text than Heidegger’s forceful essay asking “The Ques­
tion Concerning Technology” (1954) is a good example of this. 
Although Heidegger aims “to experience the technological 
within its own bounds” (4), he leads out of those bounds looking 
for an answer by linking techné and poetry via classical Greek. 
Stating that “the essence of technology is by no means anything 
technological” (4), however, Heidegger might have sent us in the 
wrong direction – interestingly, this is exactly where Arendt turns 
the other way. Instead of finding an answer to technology in the 
human artifice, she points to the functioning of technology itself:
The discussion of the whole problem of technology, that 
is, of the transformation of life and world through the 
introduction of the machine, has been strangely led astray 
through an all­too­exclusive concentration upon the service 
or disservice the machines render to men. The assumption 
here is that every tool and implement is primarily designed 
to make human life easier and human labor less painful. 
Their instrumentality is understood exclusively in this 
anthropocentric sense. But the instrumentality of tools and 
implements is much more closely related to the object it is 
designed to produce. (1958, 151; emphasis added)
The technical object, according to Arendt, is misunderstood as a 
means to human ends. Its instrumentality is always more closely 
related to another object than to a human subject. In other 
words, the immanence of technology, its own, “alien” logic, is a 
force, which is driven by an immanent – “closer” – relation. 
At the very same time, Gilbert Simondon (1958) explores this 
immanence at work in his philosophical analysis On the Mode 
of Existence of Technical Objects. Studying steam­powered and 
combustion engines, cathodes, turbines, telephones, and other 
technical objects convinces the French philosopher of the same 
close, immanent relation, which he describes as a “processus de 
195concrétisation” or process of concretization (1958, 19), triggered 
by the specific relation of a technical object with its environment. 
Comparing the modern engine of his time of writing to an older 
one from 1910, Simondon points out that the newer one is not 
“better” but that it just functions better because it is more tightly 
related to the rest of the car. This tight relation has changed 
how the engine runs in and provides energy for the car, but it 
has also made the vehicle more dependent on its environment. 
The engine of 1910 is “plus autonome,” or more autonomous, (20); 
unlike the new one, it also functioned in fishing boats without 
breaking down. This and other examples lead Simondon to a 
number of interesting conclusions that today affect thinking 
far beyond technology. For example, that the transformation 
of matter (things, bodies, thoughts) is driven by concrétisations, 
which can be explained via concrete technical relations with 
their milieu, creating an immanent development, which is non­
directional. As Elizabeth Grosz points out:
Matter has a positive property immanent in any of its 
particular characteristics – it is capable of being modelled, 
formed. Matter has what Simondon understands as plas-
ticity, the capacity to become something other than what it 
is now, as its positivity, its openness, its orientation to trans­
formation. (2012, 45, bold added)
Here Grosz points out a political – open – moment that marks the 
start of something new. It marks, however, only the start. New 
technologies, alien to the existing human artifice, offer a forceful 
moment of upsetting the setup in unforeseen ways; this is why 
understanding technology is crucial to the contemporary critic, 
and this is the case more than ever in the technical realities that 
mark the twenty­first century. 
To understand the force of technology, however, means to 
differentiate the opening of technology from its actual inter­
pretation – too often technology gets blamed for capitalistic inter­
ests that hide in it all too well. It is, however, not the fault of the 
196 mobile phone that we feel the need to be available for work on 
the weekend (Berardi 2009, 193). Instead, the connection of what 
was once free time to capitalistic interests has been installed 
by a human boss who wants his workers to be always available 
(Bunz 2014, 32); others have set rules in place to avoid emailing 
after working hours. The mobile phone, for example, could also 
be interpreted as an emancipative weapon as it also allows one to 
remotely be there for someone who needs care, a dear friend, a 
child, an old parent, which eases the work of social availability, a 
role that in this world is still mostly carried out by women. 
While in this case technology has the force to change the set up 
of the human artifice – we all become potentially available – it 
does not dictate whose interests are put across. As Haraway once 
remarked: “Technology is not neutral. We’re inside of what we 
make, and it’s inside of us. We’re living in a world of connections – 
and it matters which ones get made and unmade” (cited in Kunzru 
1997). For this, we need to turn to technology, which starts 
with using and understanding it better and ends with coding or 
hacking it – different ways to appropriate it are possible and open 
to us all. Technology might be an alien force, but unsurprisingly 
we cannot sit back and let capitalism create the revolution. 
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